Blending In
In the last chapter, we saw a reaction correspondence that naturally developed when attackers realized they could circumvent dead disk forensic analysis, the established forensic method at the time. We also saw what happened when the defense reacted to this strategy, using technologies like memory scanning, EDR solutions, and network analysis. Where once attackers avoided non-repudiation by operating in memory, now defenders have logs of parent-child relationships, remote thread creations, or anomalous process memory, for example. This means attackers are not necessarily invisible when operating in memory; on the contrary, they may set off alerts if the defense is well instrumented. To counter this new reaction correspondence or shift in strategy, the attackers may look to blend into the target environment rather than attempt to operate below the radar. Doing so may require some tradeoffs, such as writing files to disk, but the attacker can get an advantage by deceiving...
