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Windows APT Warfare

You're reading from   Windows APT Warfare Identify and prevent Windows APT attacks effectively

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Product type Paperback
Published in Mar 2023
Publisher Packt
ISBN-13 9781804618110
Length 258 pages
Edition 1st Edition
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Author (1):
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Sheng-Hao Ma Sheng-Hao Ma
Author Profile Icon Sheng-Hao Ma
Sheng-Hao Ma
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Table of Contents (17) Chapters Close

Preface 1. Part 1 – Modern Windows Compiler
2. Chapter 1: From Source to Binaries – The Journey of a C Program FREE CHAPTER 3. Chapter 2: Process Memory – File Mapping, PE Parser, tinyLinker, and Hollowing 4. Chapter 3: Dynamic API Calling – Thread, Process, and Environment Information 5. Part 2 – Windows Process Internals
6. Chapter 4: Shellcode Technique – Exported Function Parsing 7. Chapter 5: Application Loader Design 8. Chapter 6: PE Module Relocation 9. Part 3 – Abuse System Design and Red Team Tips
10. Chapter 7: PE to Shellcode – Transforming PE Files into Shellcode 11. Chapter 8: Software Packer Design 12. Chapter 9: Digital Signature – Authenticode Verification 13. Chapter 10: Reversing User Account Control and Bypassing Tricks 14. Index 15. Other Books You May Enjoy Appendix – NTFS, Paths, and Symbols

Relocation table of PE

In the previous chapters, we assumed that executable files must be mounted on the image base expected by the compiler. However, in the following cases, we may need to mount the PE module on an image base that is not expected at the time of compilation:

  • There must be multiple mounted PE modules in a single process (regardless of EXE or DLL) and it is obvious that the common 0x400000 image address cannot be chosen for each DLL module during compilation.

Therefore, Microsoft designed relocation for PE, which is used to solve the challenge of mapping a PE module to an unexpected image base.

  • In the Calling programs directly in memory section of Chapter 5, we encountered a similar problem with the application loader that we tried to replicate. Since the application loader is already mapped to 0x400000, it is no longer possible to mount the EXE file on the occupied 0x400000 memory.
  • With the Service Pack 2 (SP2) patch, Windows XP provides Address...
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