Chapter 1, Industrial Control Systems, this chapter starts with an overview of the individual parts that make up an Industrial control system. It then explains the different types of Industrial control systems and the devices and technologies typically found within them. This chapter will also introduce the Purdue model, shows where parts of an ICS system belong within that model and describes which network technologies and protocols are used for communication between them.
Chapter 2, Insecure by Inheritance, this chapter explains how Industrial control systems were originally designed to be open, easy-to-use, reliable and fast and how security was never a design goal for various reasons. Then, the chapter will explain how, for the support of ICS network convergence, these insecure proprietary technologies were adapted to work on a common transport medium—Ethernet—and the security implications of doing this. The chapter includes detailed description of the most popular communication protocols and their vulnerabilities.
Chapter 3, Anatomy of an ICS Attack Scenario, this chapter sets the stage of the next part of the book, ICS insecurity. It will take the reader through the steps of a real-world ICS attack scenario as performed on a fictional company’s ICS network (this ICS network will be used throughout the rest of the book as a silver lining to illustrate the material at hand). It explains in detail the motivation, objective, process/procedures, the tools used and possible outcome of a modern day Industrial control system attack and compromise.
Chapter 4, Industrial Control System Risk Assessment, this chapter shows how to use the knowledge learned from the attack scenario from the previous chapter and use it to understand the reasoning behind ICS risk assessments. It introduces the concept of kill chains or attack matrixes and how they are used to start planning mitigation efforts.
The chapter will read as a continuation on the intrusion story from 3rd chapter with the fictional company hiring a security consultant to assess their ICS security posture.
Chapter 5, The Purdue Model and a Converged Plantwide Ethernet, this chapter is a detailed explanation on the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (short for PERA) as it pertains to ICS architecture—the Purdue model. The Purdue model is an industry best-practice and widely adopted concept model for ICS network segmentation and is used extensively to explain security strategies and architecture.
Chapter 6, The Defense-in-depth Model, this chapter explains the defense in-depth model, how it fits into the Converged Plantwide Ethernet model and how it relates to ICS security. This chapter sets the stage of the remainder of this part of the book.
Chapter 7, Physical ICS Security, This chapter explains how to restrict physical access to the ICS by discussing the methodology of ICS centric physical security and applying some of the best practice techniques and activities as outlined that are outlined in the defense-in-depth model.
Chapter 8, ICS Network Security, this chapter explains how to restrict access to the ICS network by discussing the methodology of ICS centric network security and applying some of the best practice techniques and activities that are outlined in the defense in depth model.
Chapter 9, ICS Computer Security, this chapter explains how to harden ICS computer systems by discussing the methodology of ICS centric computer security and applying some of the best practice techniques and activities that are outlined in the defense in depth model.
Chapter 10, ICS Application Security, This chapter shows how to improve application security by application hardening exercises and discussing ICS centric life cycle management methodologies.
Chapter 11, ICS Device Security, this chapter shows how to improve device security by device hardening exercises and discussing ICS centric device life cycle management methodologies.
Chapter 12, The ICS Cybersecurity Program Development Process, this chapter explains the activities and functions involved in setting up an ICS security program including defining of ICS centric security policies and risk management.
