Within industrial control networks, there has traditionally been an inherent level of trust between devices in the network. Devices on the control network were able to freely exchange data and send commands to each other without any authentication, authorization, or encryption. However, since threat actors have increased their focus on ICS networks over the past few decades, there is a growing concern around the lack of security of ICS network protocols.
Today, there are even tools such as EtherSploit-IP (https://github.com/thiagoralves/EtherSploit-IP) that can be easily leveraged by an attacker to create havoc within an ICS network without the need for understanding the industrial control systems protocols or software. So, how do we defend against tools such as EtherSploit-IP, which take advantage of the insure-by-design nature of ICS networks? We could start by implementing secure protocols that implement...
