Security aspects of software architecture

An important element to take into consideration when creating an architecture is the security requirements. Not every application is the same, so some can be more relaxed in this aspect than others. For example, a banking application needs to be 100 times more secure than, say, an internet forum for discussing cats. The most common example of this is the storage of passwords. The most naive approach to passwords is to store them, in plain text, associated with a username or email address – say, in a file or a database table. When the user tries to log in, we receive the input password, compare it with the one stored previously, and, if they are the same, we allow the user to log in. Right?

Well, this is a very bad idea, because it can produce serious problems:

• If an attacker has access to the storage for the application, they'll be able to read the passwords of all the users. Users tend to reuse passwords (even if it's a bad idea), so, paired with their emails, they'll be exposed to attacks on multiple applications, not only the breached one.

This may seem unlikely, but keep in mind that any copy of the data stored is susceptible to attack, including backups.

• Another real issue is insider threats, workers who may have legitimate access to the system but copy data for nefarious purposes or by mistake. For very sensitive data, this can be a very important consideration.
• Mistakes like displaying the password of a user in status logs.

To make things secure, data needs to be structured in a way that's as protected as possible from access or even copying, without exposing the real passwords of users. The usual solution to this is to have the following schema:

1. The password itself is not stored. Instead, a cryptographical hash of the password is stored. This applies a mathematical function to the password and generates a replicable sequence of bits, but the reverse operation is computationally very difficult.
2. As the hash is deterministic based on the input, a malicious actor could detect duplicated passwords, as their hashes are the same. To avoid this problem, a random sequence of characters, called a salt, is added for each account. This will be added to each password before hashing, meaning two users with the same password but different salts will have different hashes.
3. Both the resulting hash and the salt are stored.
4. When a user tries to log in, their input password is added to the salt, and the result is compared with the stored hash. If it's correct, the user is logged in.

Note that in this design, the actual password is unknown to the system. It's not stored anywhere and is only accepted temporarily to compare it with the expected hash, after being processed.

This example is presented in a simplified way. There are multiple ways of using this schema and different ways of comparing a hash. For example, the bcrypt function can be applied multiple times, increasing encryption each time, which can increase the time required to produce a valid hash, making it more resistant to brute-force attacks.

This kind of system is more secure than one that stores the password directly, as the password is not known by the people operating the system, nor is it stored anywhere.

The problem of mistakenly displaying the password of a user in status logs may still happen! Extra care should be taken to make sure that sensitive information is not being logged by mistake.

In certain cases, the same approach as for passwords can be taken to encrypt other stored data, so that only customers can access their own data. For example, you can enable end-to-end encryption for a communication channel.

Security has a very close relationship with the architecture of a system. As we saw before, the architecture defines which aspects are easy and difficult to change and can make some unsafe things impossible to do, like knowing the password of a user, as we described in the previous example. Other options include not storing data from the user to keep privacy or reducing the data exposed in internal APIs, for example. Software security is a very difficult problem and is often a double-edged sword, and trying to make a system more secure can have the side effect of making operations long-winded and inconvenient.