References

1. We generally advise that email addresses associated with our domain names, such as in Whois records and logins to vendor consoles, be at domain names under our direct control, even if they ultimately forward to another destination.
2. This preference remains intact even in the aftermath of the very visible, professionally embarrassing Government of Ontario nameserver hijacking that happened on my watch in 2014, the one I described in the "It could have been worse" sidebar in the preface to this book. That said, the Government of Ontario now employs registry locks on their key domains.
3. DNS Security: In-depth vulnerability analysis and mitigation solutions by Anestis Karasaridis.

4. Like when Eugene Kashpureff hijacked the Network Solutions internic website in 1997: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/02/when-the-internet-nearly-fractured-and-how...