What is cyber threat intelligence?
My experiences have led me to the opinion that CTI and threat hunting are processes and methodologies tightly coupled with, and in support of, traditional security operations (SecOps).
When we talk about traditional SecOps, we're referring to the deployment and management of various types of infrastructure and defensive tools – think firewalls, intrusion detection systems, vulnerability scanners, and antiviruses. Additionally, this includes some of the less exciting elements, such as policy, and processes such as privacy and incident response (not to say that incident response isn't an absolute blast). There are copious amounts of publications that describe traditional SecOps and I'm certainly not going to try and re-write them. However, to grow and mature as a threat hunter, you need to understand where CTI and threat hunting fit into the big picture.
When we talk about CTI, we mean the processes of collection, analysis, and production to transition data into information, and lastly, into intelligence (we'll discuss technologies and methodologies to do that later) and support operations to detect observations that can evade automated detections. Threat hunting searches for adversary activity that cannot be detected through the use of traditional signature-based defensive tools. These mainly include profiling and detecting patterns using endpoint and network activity. CTI and threat hunting combined are the processes of identifying adversary techniques and their relevance to the network being defended. They then generate profiles and patterns within data to identify when someone may be using these identified techniques and – this is the often overlooked part – lead to data-driven decisions.
A great example would be identifying that abusing authorized binaries, such as PowerShell or GCC, is a technique used by adversaries. In this example, both PowerShell and GCC are expected to be on the system, so their existence or usage wouldn't cause a host-based detection system to generate an alert. So CTI processes would identify that this is a tactic used by adversaries, threat hunting would profile how these binaries are used in a defended network, and finally, this information would be used to inform active response operations or recommendations to improve the enduring defensive posture.
Of particular note is that while threat hunting is an evolution from traditional SecOps, that isn't to say that it is inherently better. They are two sides of the same coin. Understanding traditional SecOps and where intelligence analysis and threat hunting should be folded into it is paramount to being successful as a technician, responder, analyst, or leader. In this chapter, we'll discuss the different parts of traditional security operations and how threat hunting and analysis can support SecOps, as well as how SecOps can support threat hunting and incident response operations:
Figure 1.1 – The relationship between IT and cyber security
In the following chapters, we'll discuss several models, both industry-standard ones as well as my own, along with my thoughts on them, what their individual strengths and weaknesses are, and their applicability. It is important to remember that models and frameworks are just guides to help identify research and defensive prioritizations, incident response processes, and tools to describe campaigns, incidents, and events. Analysts and operators get into trouble when they try to use models as one-size-fits-all solutions that, in reality, are purely linear and inflexibly rigid.
The models and frameworks that we'll discuss are as follows:
- The Intelligence Pipeline
- The Lockheed Martin Kill Chain
- The MITRE ATT&CK Matrix
- The Diamond Model
Finally, we'll discuss how the models and frameworks are most impactful when they are chained together instead of being used independently.
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